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greater crop insurance coverage, which reduced farmers’ financial risks.  Did this change in the 
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difference in differences empirical approach controls for unobservable heterogeneity and our 
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shrank.    Regardless  of  size,  producers  showed  some  evidence  of  using  diversification  as  a 
method to mitigate risk.  However, risk does not seem to have large overall effects. 
 
Keywords: acreage decisions, crop insurance, diversification, risk  
 
Paper prepared for presentation at the 2005 AAEA meetings in Providence, RI. 
Correspondence: 
Erik J. O’Donoghue 
Economic Research Service 
1800 M St., NW 






*Economic Research Service, USDA. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
correspond to the views or policies of ERS or the U.S. Department of Agriculture.   2 
I. Introduction 
Does risk matter to producers?  If so, how does risk matter and how important is it?  If 
risk is not important, why isn’t it?  This information is crucial for understanding producers’ 
decisions (whether to enter, to exit, to alter production practices, etc.) and can help to explain the 
structures of firms and industries.   
According  to  the  Small  Business  Administration  definitions,  a  small  business  is 
independently  owned  and  operated  and  (the  most  common  definition)  has  fewer  than  500 
employees.  The share of businesses that fall into this category lies around 99 percent while the 
share of private, nonfarm GDP produced by small businesses lies around 50 percent.
1  Risk is 
highly endemic to these firms.  Only about 50 percent of all small businesses remain solvent 
after their first three years.  Understanding how risk can affect the majority of producers and 
influence half the production of the U.S. economy becomes an important issue.   
While these figures relate to nonfarm GDP, agriculture is a natural setting in which to 
examine these questions.  Even the largest farm operations tend to fall under the heading of small 
business owners as defined by the SBA.  In addition, farm outputs tend to be homogenous, 
making it easier to compare results amongst operations.  Operators must deal with many sources 
of risk, an inherent part of agriculture.  Farmers face price risk (a source of risk all businesses, in 
particular  small  businesses,  face)  and  production  risk  (a  source  less  likely  for  most  small 
businesses to face).  Weather, pests, crop/animal diseases, and health risks make up a few of the 
risks farmers must contend with.  Finally, there are about two million farms, each of which is 
mandated by law to fill out the Agricultural Census forms every five years.  This allows us to 
construct a large panel data set to explore issues related to risk.   3 
  While  much  research  has  been  devoted  to  studying  risk  and  its  implications  for 
production, little consensus exists as to its effects.  Part of the reason for this lack of agreement 
has  to  do  with  the  difficulty  of  quantifying,  isolating,  and  identifying  risk  and  its  role  in 
production (Just and Pope, 2003).  In theoretical work, scholars tend to assume a specific type 
and level of risk aversion on the part of the producer, obtaining results that follow directly from 
these assumptions.  In empirical work, scholars have difficulty finding data that quantify risk 
well.  Empirical methods often use endogenous explanatory variables (e.g, variability of profits, 
prices, yields, etc.) to explain the producer behavior toward risk.  It is likely that the usual risk 
measures also suffer from omitted variable biases—firms with different levels of risk tend to 
differ in many other ways. 
  To estimate the causal impact of risk on production, one needs (1) a quantifiable measure 
of exposure to risk, (2) a source of identification that causes exposure to risk to be different for 
different  firms,  and  (3)  a  way  to  limit  the  possibility  of  omitted  variable  biases  and  biases 
stemming  from  unobservable  heterogeneity.    Recent  policy  changes  provide  a  source  of 
identification that allows us to address all three empirical requirements. 
Our  exogenous  source  of  variation  in  risk  comes  from  a  Congressionally  mandated 
increase in subsidies aimed at making crop insurance more affordable for farmers, enacted in the 
Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act (FCIRA) of 1994.  Figure 1 shows total subsidies, total 
premiums, and total acres enrolled in the crop insurance program from 1990 to 1998. The figure 
contains separate plots for all crops and for the three largest individual crops (in acreage): corn, 
soybeans, and wheat.  In 1997, these three crops made up 78.9% of the acreage insured, 55.5% 
of the subsidies, 51.7% of the total premiums paid, and 53.8% of cultivated cropland (excluding 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 This estimate of share of GDP comes from Joel Popkin and Company, 2001, and was found at the website: 
http://216.239.57.104/search?q=cache:8Bz0-  4 
hay).  The premium includes the farmers’ actual out of pocket expense plus the government 
subsidy, which we assume equals a market premium that a private insurer would have charged.
2 
The  figure  shows  a  marked  increase  in  crop  insurance  coverage  following 
implementation of the FCIRA.  Across all crops, total premium payments more than doubled, 
providing  a  powerful  source  of  identification.  Furthermore,  premiums  for  wheat  increased 
somewhat less than for corn, which allows us to compare changes in production to differential 
changes in premium growth.
3  This differential effect of FCIRA across wheat and corn stems 
from ex-ante differences in risks and the structure of the subsidies.  Since wheat tends to be 
grown on riskier farmland, a greater proportion was insured prior to FCIRA.  Moreover, the 
subsidies were structured such that they were worth more to corn growers than to wheat growers 
which induced a larger growth in participation for corn growers. 
Table 1 gives additional information on the FCIRA for ten crops that accounted for 85% 
of premiums paid in 1997.  The table reports 1992 and 1997 levels of premiums, acres harvested, 
share of acres insured, premiums per acre harvested, premiums per insured acre, and subsidies 
per insured acre.  There were large increases in insurance subsidies for most crops between 1992 
and  1997.  Larger  subsidies  induced  an  increase  in  the  number  of  acres  insured  and  greater 
coverage per acre, which in turn resulted in higher premiums paid. For barley, potatoes, and dry 
beans,  premiums  per  acre  harvested  increased  by  about  one-third;  for  wheat  and  sorghum, 
premiums increased by about one-half; and cotton, corn, and soybean premiums increased by 
almost two-thirds.  The most extreme cases were peanuts, which showed little increase (the crop 
                                                                                                                                                             
I93tvgJ:www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs211.pdf+%22small+business%22+gdp&hl=en 
2 We assume that the total insurance premiums represent actuarially fair assessments of the risk that would have 
been charged by a private market in the absence of government provision of subsidies.  Also note that private 
provision of crop insurance without government involvement does not exist. 
3 Note that in 1995, but not in subsequent years, farmers were required to establish a minimum level of coverage in 
the crop insurance program in order to maintain eligibility for other kinds of government payments.  This explains 
the spike in acres insured 1995 and the modest decline thereafter.   5 
was heavily insured before the policy change), and tobacco, which showed a huge increase (no 
federal crop insurance was available in 1992).   
The type of data we used limits any biases stemming from unobserved heterogeneity and 
omitted variables.  The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation provides crop insurance to American 
producers and is managed and operated by the Risk Management Agency (RMA).  The RMA 
maintains records of all the policies provided, allowing us to obtain county level data on the 
levels of insurance for each crop.  From these data we construct a coverage level for each farmer 
based on their crop mix and the county levels of insurance purchased.  However, due to the 
endogeneity of this variable, we construct an instrument using national level insurance data and 
lagged (1992) crop mixes.  We use this as a measure of the amount of risk producers faced: more 
coverage implies less income risk.  Since farmers valued the subsidy increases dependent upon 
various attributes, including their crop mix and location, they faced different levels of exposure 
to risk, allowing us to identify the effect of risk on production decisions.  Finally, we use the 
Agricultural  Census  microfiles  from  1992  and  1997,  the  immediate  years  surrounding  the 
implementation of FCIRA, to construct a panel data set to estimate risk’s impact on producers’ 
decisions.     
We  estimate  two  sets  of  regressions  using  two  stage  least  squares  to  handle  our 
instrumental variable estimation.  We regress the change in cropland on the change in risk faced 
by producers in the first set, using the change in coverage as our source of variation in risk.  In 
the second set we regress the change in diversification on the farm on the change in coverage.  In 
both  sets  of  regressions  we  run  many  different  specifications  including  various  controls  and 
multiple measures of our dependent variables to check for robustness.    6 
We find that the smallest farms (less than $100,000 in sales) tended to shrink while larger 
farms (greater than $100,000 in sales) increased in size.  When examining the structure of the 
farm, we find evidence that all producers appeared to become more specialized (less diversified) 
in response to risk reduction.  However, overall magnitudes of changes in production practices 
were small. 
 
II. Background  
If  attitudes  towards  risk  alter  the  level  of  production,  this  has  important  policy 
implications and has garnered some attention in the literature.  Chavas and Holt (1990) used 
national data to examine the impact of wealth effects and risk on acreage allocation decisions.  
They found positive wealth effects, casting doubt on the commonly used constant absolute risk 
aversion assumptions and mean-variance risk analysis, both of which assume zero wealth effects.  
They also found acreage allocation decisions depended on the risk environment.  Wu (1999), 
using a simultaneous set of equations to examine cropping pattern and insurance choices, found 
that crop insurance led to a change in cropping patterns for smaller farms, generally towards less 
productive and environmentally “sensitive” lands.  Larger farms did not exhibit this pattern.  Wu 
and  Adams  (2001)  found  that  producers  who  adopted  revenue  insurance  tended  to  shift 
production to corn and soybeans from other crops, the magnitude of which depended upon the 
level of coverage adopted.  
Goodwin,  et  al  (2002)  used  county  level  data  and  also  found  that  crop  insurance 
programs have resulted in additional land being brought into production, although they argued 
that these increases were economically insignificant.   At a more aggregated level, Young, et al. 
(2001), using a simulation model with assumptions concerning adoption and returns to crop   7 
insurance,  found  similar  results.    However,  they  only  explored  the  returns  per  acre  in  their 
model, and did not examine risk implications of crop insurance.   
These papers tended to use county level data and attempted to jointly estimate choices of 
crop insurance adoption and acreage responses to adoption.  Unobservable heterogeneity at the 
individual level could yield biased results.  Also, the use of variables such as the coefficient of 
variation of yields and diversification indices are endogenous and tied to confounding factors 
associated with location.
4  It therefore remains unclear whether the associations reported in these 
studies between cropping patterns and insurance (or risk) were causal. 
Important  policy  implications  due  to  changes  in  the  risk  environment  also  include 
changes in the structure of the farm, and possibly the structure of industry.  Diversification as a 
means of dealing with risk has garnered a good deal of attention in the literature.  In a vein 
similar to Markowitz (1952) and Tobin’s (1958) approach to portfolio theory, Heady (1952) 
argued that farmers could diversify production to mitigate the risk they face, generally trading 
off higher returns for a reduced variance in the returns.  Carter and Dean (1960), Greve, Plaxico, 
and Lagrone (1960), Stovall (1966) and Johnson (1967) elaborated on the farm diversification 
problem,  attempting  to  understand  the  normative  implications  of  how  to  optimally  diversify 
under uncertainty.  Robison and Blake (1979) modified the theory to incorporate asset illiquidity 
and asset fixity, which serve to reduce the incentives of farmers to revise their portfolios as 
prices vary. 
Empirical applications outside agriculture have had mixed results (Ahtiala, 2000; Berger 
and Ofek, 1995).  However, those applications in agriculture have generally validated portfolio 
theory in both domestic (Schurle and Erven, 1979; Held and Zink, 1982; Falatoonzadeh, et. al,   8 
1985) and developing economy (Ballivian and Sickles, 1995; Llewellyn and Williams, 1995) 
settings.   
Alternative methods and rationales for portfolio adjustments have been developed in the 
literature with mixed results and often lacking causal arguments.  For example, White and Irwin 
(1972) and Mishra and El-Osta (2002) found evidence that larger farms tended to specialize 
while  Pope  and  Prescott  (1980),  Gasson  (1988),  Ilberry  (1991),  and  Shucksmith  and  Smith 
(1991) all found the opposite.   
Additionally,  lifecycle  hypotheses  (Damianos  and  Skuras,  1996;  Potter  and  Gasson, 
1988), off-farm income (El-Osta et. al, 1995; Mishra and Goodwin, 1997; Mishra and Sandretto, 
2002; and Ahearn, et al, 2002) and agronomic issues (El-Nazer and McCarl, 1986) all could play 
important roles in explaining how and why the farm operator manages risk. 
 
III. Methodology 
A. The General Model 
To estimate risk’s effect on producers’ decisions, we take advantage of a policy change 
that  occurred  in  1994  where  the  government  dramatically  increased  the  subsidies  for  crop 
insurance.  We use an event study, exploring the changes in production decisions before and 
after the implementation of FCIRA.   
For producer i (i = 1,..., N) in time t (t = 1992, 1997), let Yit represent the dependent 
variable.  For our first and second set of regressions, Yit denotes the number of acres of cropland 
harvested. For our third set of regressions, Yit represents the level of diversification on the farm.  
Let Yit be a function of a set of  factors  Xit that characterize the  farm  and the producer that 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 For example, yield variations are not entirely due to chance.  Fertilizer and chemical choices will affect yields, as   9 
influence the propensity to alter the level of acreage used as cropland.
5  The producer’s choice to 
alter the levels of cropland may also depend on the risk environment.  We use the operator’s per-
acre crop insurance coverage, Cit, to measure the level of risk the producer faced.  We also posit 
that this effect may depend on the size of the operation.  Therefore, we interact the coverage 
variable with a dummy variable reflecting the farm’s size (as defined by level of sales) category.
6  
This gives us the following equation: 





￿  are all coefficients to be estimated, Sit denotes a dummy variable reflecting the 
scale of the operation, and 
￿ it represents the random error term.  We use a per-acre coverage level 
in  (1)  since  producers  choose  the  total  coverage  level  and  amount  of  acres  in  cropland 
simultaneously (i.e. we would expect a positive correlation between the acres of cropland chosen 
and the total coverage level, regardless of whether risk influences acreage decisions).   
  We want to look at the change of the decisions made by producers from before to after 
the implementation of FCIRA.  Therefore, we want to estimate the difference between period 
one (1997, or post-FCIRA) and period zero (1992, or pre-FCIRA).  Differencing gives us the 
following equation to estimate: 
(2)  i i i i i S C X Y e g b a + × D + D + = D 0 . 
Now the change in acreage allocation is a function of the change in any factors that characterize 
the farm and the producer that influence the propensity to alter the level of acreage used as 
                                                                                                                                                             
well as seed choice and tillage practices.  Of course, there will always be a stochastic component, that could be 
large, with respect to yields, but yields can be affected by choices made, making them not entirely exogenous. 
5 A similar exposition exists for our third set of regressions involving diversification rather than acreage allocation.  
For the sake of brevity, we only include a discussion of the acreage allocation decisions here. 
6 We used four categories of size of the operation.  The first held farms that sold less than $25,000 worth of 
agricultural goods.  The second contained farms that sold between $25,000 and $100,000 worth of agricultural 
commodities.  Farms with sales between $100,000 and $250,000 comprised the third group, while farms with sales 
over $250,000 made up the fourth group.   10 
cropland and the change in the coverage levels adopted as a result of FCIRA.  We use the period 
zero (1992) size categories for the farms (Si0) to ensure that any contemporaneous decisions on 
altering the size of the farm do not bias the estimates of 
￿ .   
  This  approach  removes  a  large  degree  of  the  potential  for  biases  attributable  to 
unobservable  heterogeneity  and  omitted  variables.    Variables  of  importance  that  we  cannot 
measure easily or effectively (e.g. personality traits, the productivity of the land, etc.) could bias 
the results if not included in a cross-sectional analysis.  This approach eliminates these variables 
and any biases they might have introduced, to the extent that these types of variables remain 
constant through time but vary spatially.   
For our analysis, we must construct a coverage level for each operator.  We therefore 
make a couple of assumptions: (1) every producer with insurable crops adopts insurance; and (2) 
the level of adoption by each farmer is defined by her share of insurable crops and the total level 
of insurance actually adopted in each county.  In particular, we construct a farm-level measure of 
insurance coverage based on the county average crop insurance premium per acre.  The premium 
should provide a good measure of the level of coverage adopted in each county.  We take this 
county  level  of  adopted  insurance  and  distribute  it  to  each  farmer  based  on  their  respective 
relative levels of insurable crops.  Thus, the estimated level of coverage per acre for producer i in 
time t is 






jt it s A P C    11 
where 
c
jt P  denotes the total premiums paid
7 in county c for crop j in time t; 
c
jt A  represents the 
total acres planted in county c of crop j in time t; and  ijt s  is the share of land that operator i has in 
crop j in time t.  We then split the farms into four separate groups depending on their level of 
sales by multiplying the coverage variable, Cit by Si0 as seen in equation (2).  This gives us four 
coverage variables to be used in our regression analyses.   
 
B. The Two-Stage Least Squares Approach 
The coverage variable outlined above has potential endogeneity concerns.  In particular, 
c
jt A , the amount of land chosen to be in production for crop j in time t in county c, is endogenous.  
This  means  that  estimation  of  equation  (2)  is  likely  to  result  in  biased  estimates  of 
￿ .    We 
therefore use a two stage least squares instrumental variable approach to get rid of the source of 
endogeneity by constructing a set of instrumental variables that get used in the first stage to 
create the instruments for the second stage analysis.  We construct our instrumental variable 




jt A P ) rather than the county 
average, along with the 1992 shares of cropland: 






jt it s A P IV C 0  
This instrumental variable is now a function of the average national premium per acre 
(which, due to its high level of aggregation, should not run into the same endogeneity issues as 
the coverage level using the county level of aggregation) and uses only lagged (1992), rather 
than  contemporaneous,  shares  of  cropland  for  each  farmer.    We  then  construct  the  four 
                                                 
7 For simplicity, we will refer to the contributions of the farmers plus the subsidies paid by the government as the 
“total premiums paid.”   12 
instrumental variables by multiplying CitIV by the size variable Si0.  The second stage regression 
then looks like the following: 
(5)  i i i i i S I X Y e g b a + × D + D + = D 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ  
where Iit represents the instrument derived from the first stage of the two stage least squares 
analysis using the two separate coverage variables outlined above.   
 
C. Identification Based on Differences 
By using two time periods, one before the policy and one after its implementation, we 
can examine the changes in per-acre coverage levels.  Since the pre-FCIRA levels of coverage 
were relatively low and the post-FCIRA levels were substantially higher, we infer that the policy 
change was a major determinant of the dramatic growth in insurance coverage.  We use this 
change in coverage to measure the change in the risk environment the producers faced.  We 
therefore estimate how the acres of cropland changed in response to changes in the level of risk 
exposure (coverage).   
Estimation of (5) allows us to identify the effect of risk on production decisions.  Since 
the introduction of FCIRA led to such dramatic shifts in the levels of coverage, we inferred that 
the changes in coverage were exogenous.  Additionally, we theorized that the introduction of 
FCIRA  had  different  value  for  different  types  of  farms  in  different  regions.    For  instance, 
operators producing crops on riskier land would value the crop insurance more than those who 
grew crops on better ground, since it would be more likely that they would receive indemnities.  
Also, holding yield risk constant, the premium would be effectively greater for farms with higher 
average yields and those with higher valued crops (e.g. corn versus wheat).     13 
  To test this theory, we regress the percentage change in insured acreage on the county-
level change in premiums per acre.  We construct the dependent variable by dividing the number 
of insured acres in the county by the number of acres in the ten program crops in that county for 
both 1992 and 1997.  We then calculate the percentage change from 1992 to 1997.  For the 
independent variable, we subtract the total dollar amount of premiums paid in 1992 from the 
total in 1997 and divide by the number of acres actually insured in 1992.  The results, found in 
table 2, show that those counties with low levels of pre-FCIRA coverage that increased their 
coverage post-FCIRA to take advantage of the high levels of subsidies were the counties that 
increased the number of acres to be insured the most as well.  Similarly, those counties with high 
levels of pre-FCIRA coverage did not have to increase their post-FCIRA coverage levels to take 
advantage of the high subsidies.  These counties did not show large increases in the number of 
acres insured over time.  These results give us further confidence that we properly identified the 
effect of risk on production decisions.   
 
D. Controls  
We  now  have  a  methodology  that  (1)  utilizes an  exogenous  source  of  variation  (the 
introduction of FCIRA) of risk that can be measured (through the use of premiums); (2) allows 
us to identify the effect of risk (since we posit that the FCIRA had a different value for operators 
in different regions growing different crops); and (3) permits us to control for unobservable 
heterogeneity and omitted variables (by differencing).  However, we must also control for those 
variables  that  do  change  over  time  (i.e.  that  would  not  get  wiped  out  by  differencing).  
Additionally, there is the possibility that in the years between 1992 and 1997 other factors could 
have arisen that might be correlated with changes in insurance coverage that also may have   14 
altered production decisions.  If not controlled for, these factors would bias the estimates ofgˆ in 
equation (5).   
The matrix X contains a set of variables we use to control for certain characteristics of the 
producer  and  the  operation,  as  well  as  the  general  environment  within  which  the  operator 
functioned.  In this matrix we include the size (measured by sales category) and SIC code of the 
operation, along with the age, sex, and experience of the producer.  To control for the general 
environment, we include state fixed effects and lagged prices of outputs multiplied by the share 
of production of each producer (in order to weight the lagged price by its relative importance to 
the operator).  Since it was possible that many of these effects could interact with each other (for 
example, corn farms in Iowa could experience different concerns than wheat farms in Kansas), 
we constructed all the two-way interaction effects between size, prices, state fixed effects, and 
SIC codes.   
One major change between 1992 and 1997 was the introduction of the 1996 Federal 
Agricultural Improvement Reform Act (FAIR), also known as the “Freedom to Farm Bill.”  The 
FAIR Act radically altered the structure of agricultural support payments by decoupling these 
payments  from  production  practices.    Prior  to  the  FAIR  Act,  farmers  had  to  limit  current 
production to a share of historical plantings to qualify for payments.  The FAIR Act lifted almost 
all of these restrictions and decoupled payments from commodity price levels.  Basically, the 
FAIR Act changed the supports from contingency payments to lump-sum payments by land units 
based upon pre-FAIR Act participation in government programs.   
Producers knew the level of payments they would receive upon implementation of the 
FAIR  Act.    Since  this  level  was  contingent  upon  their  previous  history  of  involvement  in 
government  programs,  but  was  no  longer  tied  to  what  they  currently  chose  to  produce,  we   15 
included each farm’s level of government payments received in 1997 to control for their level of 
involvement in the pre-FAIR Act support programs.  If any production decisions changed as a 
result of the FAIR Act that could also be correlated with changes in the level of coverage, this 
variable should provide a good instrument for the degree to which the FAIR Act would have 
affected the operator’s production decisions.
8 
Finally, price changes could have affected production decisions that could have been 
correlated with the changes in coverage.  In order to control for the effects of prices, we included 
an interaction term that weighted the previous year’s prices (1991 and 1996 respectively) with 
the share of the commodity produced on the farm.  This should control for the effect that price 
changes would have on both the acreage and diversification decisions producers made. 
 
IV. Data  
The data we use come from the Agricultural Census and the Risk Management Agency.  
The  National  Agricultural  Statistics  Service  (NASS)  of  the  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture 
collects data concerning farm and operator characteristics every five years from essentially all 
farms in the country.  These files make up the Agricultural Census data.  Since every farm 
operator is required by law to respond to the survey, we can track operations across time, as long 
as they remain in business.  Each respondent receives a unique Census File Number (CFN) to 
track the farm, ranch, or other agricultural entity controlled or operated by the individual filing 
the census.   
Merging  the  two  years  together  by  CFN  resulted  in  a  panel  data  set  with  2,083,171 
observations.  We then restricted our sample of farms by SIC classification to those who fell into 
                                                 
8 Another change that occurred in 1995 that we have not had time to explore yet was the large enrollment that   16 
the major (insurance) program crops: namely wheat, corn, soybeans, cash grains (oilseed and 
grain combination farms), cotton, tobacco, and Irish potatoes.  This resulted in a data set with 
571,358 observations.  We want to test whether or not the change in the risk environment altered 
operators’  decisions.    Since  our  exogenous  source  of  variation  in  risk  comes  from  a  policy 
induced  change  in  the  crop  insurance  market,  we  need  to  ensure  that  our  sample  of  farms 
consisted of those that had the potential to be affected by the insurance market.  In other words, 
our sample needs to consist of those farms with a majority of their production in the insurable 
crops.  To create such a dataset, we kept farms with the major insurable crops making up at least 
90% of their total cropland harvested in 1992, leaving us with 474,843 observations.  To ensure a 
balanced panel, we kept only those producers who had entries in both 1992 and 1997, leaving us 
with 318,725 observations.  We then deleted operations where the respondents’ age did not track 
across time, leaving us with 281,465 observations.
9  Dropping entries with missing observations 
left us with our final data set consisting of 239,992 observations or 119,996 differences.   
 
A. Dependent Variables 
Our first set of dependent variables consists of the amount of cropland harvested.  Two 
main categories exist: the summation of all cropland harvested for each farm and the summation 
of the acres of the insurable crops harvested for each farm.   
For  our  second  set  of  dependent  variables,  we  constructed  several  measures  of 
diversification.  We started by creating commodity shares by dividing each operation’s sales of 
                                                                                                                                                             
occurred in CRP.  If a lot of riskier land went into CRP, enrollment could be correlated with both the coverage 
adopted and the acreage decisions made.  We have yet to explore this avenue.  
9 Since the Census is required every five years, the age of the respondent should have changed by five years.  
However, we allow for a range of 4-6 years to account for potential timing issues.  Some entries had the same CFN 
number in 1992 and 1997 but had much different ages.   Perhaps someone else on the same operation filed the 
census and (mistakenly) received the same CFN.  Alternatively, a farm could have exited in 1992 and an entrant in 
1997 might have received the same CFN.  Finally, it could have been a recording error of some kind.   17 
the  commodity  by  the  operation’s  total  sales,  including  livestock.    The  first  diversification 
measure is simply the largest share of production of a single commodity for each producer.  For 
example, if corn made up 80% of the total sales generated on the farm, then the farm’s first 
diversification measure equals 0.8.   
The  second  diversification  measure  is  an  entropy  index  that  ranges  from  0  to  100, 
depending on the number of activities the firm engages in and their relative importance.  For 
example,  a  firm  that  produces  only  one  commodity  would  have  an  entropy  measure  of  0, 
reflecting complete specialization.  A producer that divides his efforts equally amongst multiple 
activities would receive a value of 100.  One difficulty with this measure is that an operation that 
produces equal levels (measured by sales) of related outputs (e.g., corn and soybeans) would 
receive the same entropy value as would an operation that produced equal levels of unrelated 
outputs (e.g., barley and hogs), despite the fact that a broader range of skills, machinery, etc. 
would be required for the second operation than for the first.  Theil (1972) showed that the 
entropy  measure  could  be  broken  down  into  two  parts:  within  and  between  group  entropy, 
gaining insight into the level of diversification between related and unrelated activities.  These 
two measures make up our third and fourth measures of diversification. 
In order to construct the entropy measure using Theil’s method, we placed outputs into 
related  and  unrelated  groupings.    Following  Jinkins  (1994),  we  constructed  groups  in  the 
following manner: 
   18 
 
Table 3: Commodity Groupings 
 
Group  Commodity 
1  Barley, Oats, Wheat 
2  Corn, Soybeans, Sorghum 
3  Hay, Miscellaneous, Other crops 
4  Vegetables, Fruits 
5  Beef, Sheep, Hogs, Other livestock 
6  Poultry 
7  Dairy 
 
Using  these  groupings  and  sales  data,  we  constructed  the  three  entropy  measures:  Related 
Entropy, Unrelated Entropy, and Total Entropy.  Related Entropy is defined as 















































s s , 
where  { } 7 ,..., 2 , 1 Î g   denotes  the  group,  sgy  represents  the  commodity  groups’  share  of  total 
output y, sig is commodity i’s share of group g’s output, n is the number of commodities (we 
considered 17 commodities, see Table 3), and ln is the natural log operator. 
Using the same notation, Unrelated Entropy is defined as 


































Total Entropy is simply the sum of Related Entropy and Unrelated Entropy.  
The last measure of diversification that we use is a Herfindahl index to measure the 
concentration of commodity production in each farm.  We calculate the Herfindahl index by   19 
summing the squares of the commodity’s shares of total output.  Following the notation above, 
define siy as commodity i’s share of total output y.  Equation 8 then defines the Herfindahl index: 
 





B. Independent Variables 
Table 4 holds summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis.  In 1997, farms in 
our sample harvested an average of 544 acres of cropland, of which 527 acres were planted in the 
ten  program  crops  (the  “insurable  acres”)  we  focus  on.    On  average,  farms  increased  their 
cropland harvested by more than 57 acres,   48 of which came from the insurable acres. 
We created a variable, Sales, to capture the size of the operation.  Approximately 29% of 
the operations had sales less than $25,000 while around 12% had sales over $250,000.  Producers 
were  fairly  uniformly  distributed  between  9%  to  13%  for  each  of  the  nine  five  year  age 
categories we created from “less than 35” years of age to “more than 70,” the exception being 
those “less than 35,” which only had 6% of all operators.  Nearly 98% of the farmers were male 
with an average of almost 25 years of experience.  Corn farms were the most common type of 
farms (representing 36% of all farms) while wheat, soybean, and cash grain farms comprised a 
little more than one-half of all farms.  Finally, farmers received an average of $14.57 per acre in 
government payments (excluding Conservation Reserve Program payments) in 1997. 
Table 5 shows the average insurance coverage for farms in the sample in 1992 and 1997 
by sales category.  The table illustrates the FCIRA resulted in a much larger increase in total 
insurance coverage for small farms relative to larger farms.  For example, the introduction of 
FCIRA resulted in a $404 increase in total coverage for very small firms (category 1) while the   20 
very large firms (category 4) experienced a growth of $3693.40.  Since larger farms had a greater 
absolute increase in insurance coverage, we theorize that their risk environment was affected 
more by the introduction of FCIRA than was the risk environment of smaller farms.  As a result, 
we expect the operators of larger farms to have made larger changes in their production decisions 
than smaller operators – either by increasing their farm’s output or through specialization. 
 
V. Results 
A. Specifications using various controls 
The  results  of  several  models  of  the  relationship  between  the  change  in  cropland 
harvested and the change in coverage lie in table 6.  The first specification included the SIC 
codes, but no price or state fixed effects, or interaction terms between the fixed effects.  The 
second specification added state fixed effects, the third added price effects, while the fourth, our 
“full  model,”  included  interaction  terms  for  our  various  controls.    Specifically,  these  terms 
included (1) [lag SIC]*[State]; (2) [lag SIC]*[lag Price*Share Commodity]; (3) [lag SIC]*[lag Sales]; 
(4)  [State]*[lag  Price*Share  Commodity];  (5)  [State]*[lag  Sales];  and  (6)  [lag  Price*Share 
Commodity]*[lag Price*Share Commodity].
10  The first four specifications used our first coverage 
variable (using county-level average premiums) while the fifth used our “full model” with the 
second coverage variable (using national-level average premiums).   
The most important finding from these specifications is that the coefficient for the change 
in coverage for the largest farms was positive and significant at the one percent level for the 
largest set of farms.  At the same time, the smallest two categories of farms had negative and 
                                                 
10 We used the term [lag Price*Share Commodity] to control for the price effects in the economy.  We used lag 
prices since the previous year’s prices affect the current year’s production decisions.  We weighted these prices by 
each farmer’s share of the commodity to control for the degree of importance the price had on the farmer’s   21 
significant coefficients.  In other words, the largest farms appeared to have increased their size of 
operation upon the introduction of FCIRA while the two smallest categories reduced the sizes of 
their operations.  This could mean that the increased size of the larger farms came at the expense 
of the smaller farms, especially since the overall level of farmland in production tends to remain 
constant  over  time.    The  FCIRA  could  have  contributed  to  an  increase  in  concentration  of 
farming. 
 The most consistent results belonged to the variables accounting for age, experience, and 
1997 government payments.  Controlling for experience, compared to farmers younger than 35, 
all other farmers had less cropland harvested on the farm.  Additionally, as they aged, producers 
tended to continue to decrease the size of their farm.  However, more experience translated into 
larger  number  of  acres  of  harvested  cropland  which  mitigated  this  effect  to  some  degree.  
Finally, larger 1997 government payments, which we used as an instrument to control for the 
introduction of the 1996 FAIR Act, led to fewer acres of cropland harvested on the farm.    
The sex of the operator became significant in the final two specifications, using the “full 
model.”  Surprisingly, male operators tended to have smaller increases in their farm’s size than 
female operators.  Finally, the size of the operation did not have a consistent direct effect on the 
change in the number of acres of cropland harvested after including all the various controls.  The 
first three specifications had positive and significant coefficients for the size categories.  This 
meant  that,  compared  to  the  largest  farms,  the  smaller  farms  each  increased  their  cropland 
harvested to a greater degree.  In fact, the smaller the farm, the more the operator increased the 
size of the farm.  While counterintuitive, once we introduce all the fixed effects and interaction 
                                                                                                                                                             
production decisions.  For example, if a producer had a share of zero of corn, they would not care about the price of 
corn.  However, if they had 75% of their output in wheat, they would care very much about the price of wheat.   22 
effects, this effect disappears and, in fact, reverses itself, giving us the result we expected – 
namely that the larger farms expanded more than the smaller farms.    
Most of the coefficients did not change across the different specifications, showing the 
robustness of our results.  The remainder of our results will utilize the “full model,” including all 
the controls and all the various interaction effects. 
 
B.  Land Allocation 
Table 7 contains results pertaining to land allocation decisions, including four different 
specifications of the dependent variable using equation (5).  In the first specification we use the 
change in cropland harvested while we use the 1997 levels of cropland harvested regressed on 
1992 levels of cropland harvested to check for robustness in the second specification.  In the 
third specification we use changes in cropland in the ten program crops we focused on (which we 
call the “insured crops”) while in the fourth specification we use 1997 levels of these insured 
crops regressed on 1992 levels.   
The results across specifications (1) and (2), using cropland harvested, were remarkably 
robust, as were those across specifications (3) and (4), using insurable cropland harvested.  There 
were some differences between the use of cropland harvested and insurable cropland harvested, 
although the signs and levels of most of the coefficients remained the same.  The magnitudes, 
however, did change. 
In the specifications using cropland harvested, which include those crops outside the ten 
major insurable crops we focus on, the two smallest sets of farms reduced the level of their 
cropland harvested upon implementation of FCIRA.  The third largest set of farms kept the same 
levels of cropland harvested while the largest farms increased their levels of cropland harvested.    23 
The smallest farms reduced the amount of cropland harvested by nearly 1.5 acres for each dollar 
change in coverage per acre.  Given the change in coverage averaged approximately four dollars 
per acre, this means a drop of about 6 acres – a 5% change in the overall size of the farm’s 
cropland harvested.  The second smallest set of farms reduced their levels of cropland harvested 
by approximately 2.7 acres for each dollar change in coverage per acre, translating into a drop of 
nearly 11 acres for each farm in this category, representing a 3% change in the overall size of the 
average small farm’s cropland harvested.  On the other side of the spectrum, the largest farms 
increased  their  holdings  of  cropland  harvested  by  nearly  9  acres  for  each  dollar  change  in 
coverage per acre.  This means that the largest farms increased their cropland harvested by 
approximately 36 acres, representing a 2.4% change in the size of their overall size.    
The specifications using insurable cropland harvested had slightly different results.   The 
largest difference was with the second largest set of farms – which now show a significant and 
positive increase in the size of insurable cropland harvested as a result of the changes imposed by 
FCIRA.  Additionally, the coefficients on the largest farms increased from nearly 9 acres per one 
dollar/acre increase in the coverage level to approximately 11 acres per one dollar/acre increase 
in the coverage level.  Finally, the coefficients on the two smallest groups of farms retained their 
significance and sign, but were smaller than those of the first two specifications.   
These results appear to show that FCIRA had a significant, albeit small, effect on the size 
of the farms.  Upon implementation, the smallest groups of farms shrank, with most of their 
decrease in size coming from those crops that could be insured.  The largest farms, however, 
grew in response to FCIRA, with their growth coming exclusively from these insurable crops.  In 
fact,  it  appears  that  these  farms  might  have  gotten  rid  of  some  of  their  non-insurable  crop   24 
harvested acres while adding to their insurable crop acres.  It appears that FCIRA might have 
caused a transfer of resources from smaller operations to larger ones. 
Over time, older producers decreased their cropland harvested to a greater extent than 
younger producers.  Surprisingly, this effect remained consistent across all age categories. To 
some extent, this effect was mitigated by the experience variable which showed an increase over 
time  in  cropland  harvested  as  the  producer  accrued  experience.    Additionally,  compared  to 
females,  males  tended  to  increase  their  cropland  harvested  more  while  an  increase  in  1997 
government payments per acre tended to reduce cropland harvested.  For an additional dollar of 
per-acre government payments, the operator harvested nearly one-third of an acre less.  With an 
average of about $13 dollars per acre, this translated into less than a five acre difference between 
those with the mean value of payments and those without any payments at all.  Finally, the size 
of the operation tended to have a direct negative effect on the changes in acreage.  Compared to 




C. Diversification Decisions 
Defining the dependent variable in equation (5) as diversification measures, the estimated 
relationships between the change in diversification and the change in insurance coverage per acre 
lie in table 8.  Note that the coefficients corresponding to the different diversification indices 
have  different  interpretations.  The  Entropy  indices  increase  with  the  level  of  diversification 
while the Herfindahl index and the “largest share” index decrease.  Hence, we expect the various 
                                                 
11 Recall that all the analyses reported were performed with farms with at least 90% of their cropland harvested in 
the 10 major (insurable) crops we examined.  This could have biased results in some fashion so we extended the 
analysis to include farms with 75% or more of their crops in the 10 major insurable crops.  The results did not 
change significantly.    25 
coefficients for the two sets of specifications to have opposite signs.  Upon inspection of table 8 
we find that, indeed, this is the case.  Additionally, we see that the results are robust across the 
different  specifications  in  terms  of  signs  and  significance  levels  (magnitudes  are  somewhat 
difficult to interpret across the various diversification measures). 
For all size farms, the coverage variables show that producers tended to specialize more 
after the introduction of FCIRA.  The bulk of this specialization appeared to come from between 
group specialization (specification (4)).  In other words, it appears that producers specialize by 
cutting back their activities from activities that have little or no connection to the main focus of 
their current operations.   
The simplest interpretation for the dependent variables (most of which are difficult to 
interpret the implications of the magnitude of the coefficients) comes from the first specification 
using  our  crudest  measure  of  diversification:  the  largest  share  of  total  output  for  a  single 
commodity.  For a one dollar change in the coverage per acre, the share of the commodity with 
the largest share of total output increased by 0.003 for the smallest farms.  For an average change 
in coverage of $3.71 per acre, this translated into an average increase of 0.01 (or a one percent 
change) in the largest share.   
Similarly, the largest producers also specialized after FCIRA was passed, experiencing an 
increase of 0.004 in the share of the commodity with the largest share of total output for a one 
dollar change per acre of coverage.  This translates into the share of the largest commodity of the 
largest farms increasing by approximately 1.5 percent of the total share (i.e. if the largest share 
was 40% before FCIRA, it tended to be over 41.5% after FCIRA).   
The results for the diversification of the farm enterprise did not entirely conform to our 
expectations.  We had expected the change in the risk environment to cause the largest farms to   26 
specialize  more.    However,  we  thought  that  the  smallest  producers  would  remain  largely 
unaffected by FCIRA since they purchased relatively small quantities of crop insurance in the 
first  place.    Overall,  producers  appear  to  use  diversification  as  a  risk  management  strategy.  
When  the  risk  environment  became  more  favorable  for  producers,  they  tended  to  specialize 
more, regardless of farm size.   
Similar  to  previous  results,  age  again  factored  heavily  into  the  explanation  of  the 
dependent variable.   As producers aged, they tended to specialize more.  This was somewhat 
tempered by the level of experience of the operator.  However, the age effect again tended to 
dominate.  The more government payments received, the more the producer specialized.  Finally, 
males tended to specialize more than females.   
 
VI. Conclusions 
In this paper we used a natural experiment, an exogenous increase in crop insurance 
subsidies mandated by the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994, to identify and estimate 
how producers responded to changes in the risk environment.  The increase in the subsidies 
induced operators to expand their coverage, which reduced their exposure to risk.  We used data 
from the 1992 and 1997 Agricultural Census and from the Risk Management Agency’s records 
of  crop  insurance  adoption  to  analyze  producers’  acreage  and  diversification  decisions  in 
response to the implementation of FCIRA.  By using a differences-in-differences approach, we 
controlled for unobservable heterogeneity (to the extent that this heterogeneity remained constant 
over time).  Finally, our identification strategy relied upon the hypothesis that the subsidy would 
be valued differently, depending on the region of the country and the crop being produced.  We 
tested this proposition and found that the counties with largest increase in coverage were the   27 
counties with the largest percentage increase in number of acres insured, which validated our 
identification strategy. 
We found that the largest two categories of farms (with at least $100,000 of sales) 
increased their level cropland harvested in response to FCIRA, while the smallest two categories 
of farms (with less than $100,000 of sales) decreased their acres of cropland harvested.  Given 
the relative stability of the number of acres involved in agricultural production, this seems to 
imply that a transfer of acres from the smaller producers to the larger producers occurred due to 
the implementation of FCIRA (controlling for lagged prices of commodities, industry and state 
fixed effects, and various interactions between the controls).  While these trends do appear to 
exist, they do not seem to be large ones. 
Additionally, regardless of size, we found evidence that producers tend to utilize 
diversification as a risk mitigation strategy.  This is somewhat surprising for the smallest farms 
since they do not tend to purchase much insurance (i.e. they should not be affected by FCIRA).  
While producers do seem to use diversification as a risk mitigation strategy, it does not appear to 
be used very heavily.  Results show that farmers increase the level of their main activity by only 




Ahtiala, Pekka, 2000.  "Conglomerate Mergers as Defense Against the Risk of Relative Price  
Variability" Review of Economics and Statistics 82(1): 160-63. 
 
Ballivian, Maria Amparo and Robin C. Sickles, 1994.  "Product Diversification and Attitudes  
Toward Risk in Agricultural Production" The Journal of Productivity Analysis 5: 271-
286. 
 
Berger, Philip G. and Eli Ofek, 1995.  "Diversification's effect on firm value" Journal of 
Financial Economics 37: 39-65. 
 
Blank, Steven C., 2001.  "Producers Get Squeezed up the Farming Food Chain: A Theory  
of Crop Portfolio Composition and Land Use"  Review of Agricultural Economics 23(2): 
404-22. 
 
Cebenayan, A. Sinan and Philip E. Strahan, 2004.  “Risk Management, Capital Structure and 
Lending at Banks” Journal of Banking and Finance 28(1): 19-43. 
 
Chavas, Jean-Paul and Matthew T. Holt, 1990.  “Acreage Decisions under Risk: The Case of 
Corn and Soybeans” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 72(3): 529-38. 
 
Damianos, Dimitri and Dimitri Skuras, 1996.  "Farm Business and the Development of  
Alternative Farm Enterprises: an Empirical Analysis in Greece" Journal of Rural 
Studies 12(3): 273-283. 
 
El-Nazer, Talaat and Bruce A. McCarl, 1986.  "Choice of Crop Rotation" American Journal of  
Agricultural Economics 68(1): 127-36. 
 
El-Osta, Hisham S., G. A. Bernat, and Mary C. Ahearn, 1995.  "Regional Differences in the  
Contribution  of  Off-Farm  Work  to  Income  Inequality"  Agricultural  and  Resource 
Economics Review 24(1): 1-14. 
 
Elton, Edwin J. and Martin J. Gruber, 2000.  "The Rationality of Asset Allocation  
Recommendations" Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 35(1): 27-41. 
 
Goodwin, Barry K., Monte L. Vandeveer, and John L. Deal, 2002.  “An Empirical Analysis of 
Acreage Effects of Participation in the Federal Crop Insurance Program,” Working Paper. 
 
Heady, E.O., 1952.  "Diversification in Resource Allocation and Minimization of Income  
Variability" Journal of Farm Economics 34: 482-496. 
 
Held, Larry J. and Richard A. Zink, 1982.  "Farm Enterprise Choice: Risk-Return Tradeoffs for  
Cash-Crop  versus  Crop-Livestock  Systems"  North  Central  Journal  of  Agricultural 
Economics 4(2): 11-19.   29 
 
Jinkins, John E., 1994.  "Related and Unrelated Diversification On Midwestern Farms"  
Agricultural Income & Finance AIS-53: 16-20. 
 
Just, Richard E. and Rulon D. Pope, eds., 2002. A comprehensive assessment of the role of risk  
in U.S. agriculture  Natural Resource Management and Policy Series.  Kluwer Academic, 
Boston. 
 
Just, Richard E. and Rulon D. Pope, 2003.  “Agricultural Risk Analysis: Adequacy of Models, 
Data, and Issues” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 85(5): 1249-1256. 
 
Markowitz, Harry M., 1952.  "Portfolio Selection" Journal of Finance 7: 77-91. 
 
Minton, Bernadette A. and Catherine Schrand, 1999.  “The impact of cash flow volatility on 
discretionary investment and the costs of debt and equity financing” Journal of Financial 
Economics 54(3): 423-460. 
 
Mishra, Ashok and Hisham S. El-Osta, 2002.  "Risk Management Through Enterprise  
Diversification: A Farm-Level Analysis" Paper presented at the AAEA annual meetings, 
Long Beach, CA, 2002. 
 
Mishra, Ashok and Barry K. Goodwin, 1997.  "Farm Income Variability and the Supply of Off- 
Farm Labor" American Journal of Agricultural Economics 79: 880-87. 
 
Mishra, Ashok and Carmen L. Sandretto, 2002.  "Stability of Farm Income and the Role  
of Nonfarm Income in U.S. Agriculture"  Review of Agricultural Economics 
24(1): 208-221. 
 
Pope, Rulon D. and Richard Prescott, 1980.  "Diversification in Relation to Farm Size  
and Other Socioeconomic Characteristics" American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
62: 555-559. 
 
Potter, Clive and Ruth Gasson, 1988.  "Farmer Participation in Voluntary Land Diversion  
Schemes: Some Prediction from a Survey" Journal of Rural Studies 4(4): 365-375. 
 
Robison, Lindon J. and John R. Brake, 1979.  "Application of Portfolio Theory to Farmer  
and Lender Behavior" American Journal of Agricultural Economics 61(1): 158-164. 
 
Schurle, Bryan W. and Bernard L. Erven, 1979.  "The Tradeoff Between Return and Risk  
in Farm Enterprise Choice" North Central Journal of Agricultural Economics 1(1): 15-
21. 
 
Theil, Henri, 1972.  Statistical Decomposition Analysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing 
Company. 
 
Tobin, James, 1958.  "Liquidity Preference as a Behavior Towards Risk" The Review of    30 
Economic Studies 67: 65-86. 
 
Wu,  JunJie,  1999.    “Crop  Insurance,  Acreage  Decisions,  and  Nonpoint-Source  Pollution,” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 81: 305-320. 
 
Wu,  JunJie  and  Richard  M.  Adams,  2001.    “Production  Risk,  Acreage  Decisions,  and 
Implications  for  Revenue  Insurance  Programs,”  Canadian  Journal  of  Agricultural 
Economics, 49(1): 19-35. 
 
Young, C. Edwin, M. L. Vandeveer, and Randall D. Schnepf, 2001.  “Production and Price 
Impacts  of  U.S.  Crop  Insurance  Programs,”  American  Journal  of  Agricultural 
Economics, 83(5): 1196-1203. 
 
 
   31 
Figure 1. Insurance coverage of all crops and largest individual crops in years preceding and 




Source: Risk Management Agency, at http://www.rma.usda.gov/data/ 
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Table 1. Insurance coverage before and after FCIRA of 1994 
 
 
  Total premiums            
($1,000)    Total Acres 
Harvested 
(1,000) 
  Share of Acres 
Insured 




  Average Subsidy 
per Acre Insured 
($/acre) 
  Average Premium 
per Acre Insured 
($/acre) 
  1992  1997    1992  1997    1992  1997    1992  1997    1992  1997    1992  1997 
Wheat  146,118  313,933    59,003  60,953    0.497  0.833    2.53  5.16    1.36  2.98    5.09  6.2 
Cotton  90,657  252,676    11,742  13,787    0.371  0.835    7.86  18.36    6.22  12.84    21.21  21.98 
Corn  196,412  460,662    68,905  70,371    0.327  0.702    2.87  6.55    2.23  4.18    8.78  9.34 
Dry Beans  13,326  25,136    1,159  1,530    0.628  0.848    11.57  16.47    5.15  9.56    18.43  19.42 
Sorghum  24,974  44,788    10,336  8,351    0.351  0.755    2.45  5.38    1.96  3.59    6.98  7.13 
Peanuts  39,840  36,153    1,354  1,292    0.780  0.914    29.54  28.01    8.77  13.67    37.86  30.63 
Soybeans  93,715  288,374    54,672  66,135    0.262  0.659    1.74  4.37    1.69  3.29    6.62  6.63 
Potatoes  12,497  28,857    905  1,107    0.326  0.626    15.91  26.52    11.68  23.55    48.73  42.35 
Barley  17,486  23,708    6,463  5,893    0.474  0.763    2.78  4.06    1.55  2.61    5.86  5.32 
Tobacco  0  31,768    783  806    0  0.826    0  68.66    0  31.17    0  83.15 
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Table 2. Dependent Var: %
￿  Insured Acres 
Parameter  Estimate  Standard Error 
Intercept  5.19**  0.51 
￿  Coverage  0.03**  0.001 
Adj. R
2  0.39 
N  2648 
 
Note:  ** denotes significance at the 1% level.     34 
Table 4. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics for Sample 
Variable Name  Definition 
Mean  Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variables 
￿
 Cropland Harvested  Change in the number of acres of harvested cropland  57.27  409.31 
￿
 Insurable Cropland 
Harvested 
Change in the number of insurable acres of harvested cropland  48.51  393.40 
Cropland Harvested 
(1997) 
Number of acres of cropland harvested in 1997  544.08  687.92 
Insured Cropland 
Harvested (1997) 
Number of acres of harvested cropland in insurable acres  527.57  664.51 
￿
 Largest Share  Change in the Largest Commodity Share (of Total Output)  0.0005  0.18 
￿
 Total Entropy  Change in the Total Entropy  -0.03  10.40 
￿
 Related Entropy  Change in the Related Entropy (amongst like commodities)  0.02  7.52 
￿
 Unrelated Entropy  Change in the Unrelated Entropy (amongst unlike commodities)  -0.05  8.13 
￿
 Herfindahl Index  Change in the Herfindahl Index  0.01  0.21 
Independent Variables 
Sales <25  % Farms with Sales ($) < $25,000  0.29  -- 
Sales 25-100  % Farms with $25,000 < Sales ($)£ $100,000  0.34  -- 
Sales 100-250  % Farms with $100,000 < Sales ($)£ $250,000  0.25  -- 
Sales >250  % Farms with Sales ($) > $250,000  0.12  -- 
Age <35  % Farmers where Age (years) £ 35   0.06  -- 
Age 35-40  % Farmers where 35 < age (years) £ 40  0.09  -- 
Age 40-45  % Farmers where 40 < age (years) £ 45  0.12  -- 
Age 45-50  % Farmers where 45 < age (years) £ 50  0.13  -- 
Age 50-55  % Farmers where 50 < age (years) £ 55   0.12  -- 
Age 55-60  % Farmers where 55 < age (years) £ 60  0.13  -- 
Age 60-65  % Farmers where 60 < age (years) £ 65  0.12  -- 
Age 65-70  % Farmers where 65 < age (years) £ 70  0.09  -- 
Age >70  % Farmers where 70 < age (years)  0.14  -- 
Sex  Dummy variable = 1 if male; 0 else  0.98  -- 
Experience  Years of farming experience of operator  25.06  13.19 
Wheat  SIC 111 (% farms classified as wheat farms)  0.12  -- 
Corn  SIC 115 (% corn farms)  0.36  -- 
Soybeans  SIC 116 (% soybean farms)  0.18  -- 
Cash Grains  SIC 119 (% oilseed and grain combination farms)  0.23  -- 
Cotton  SIC 131 (% cotton farms)  0.04  -- 
Tobacco  SIC 132 (% Tobacco farms)  0.07  -- 
Potatoes  SIC 134 (% Irish potato farms)  0.006  -- 
￿
 Coverage per Acre  Change in Coverage per acre  3.71  10.94 
Coverage 1997  Estimated value of crop insurance purchased per acre harvested, 
1997 – See text for details 
6.08  11.14 
Coverage 1992  Estimated value of crop insurance purchased per acre harvested, 
1992– See text for details 
2.36  4.48 
Gov_pay_acre 97  Total government payments per acre harvested in 1997, 
excluding Conservation Reserve Program payments 
14.57  55.10 
Observations  Number of observations in panel  119996 
Source: All variables from the Census of Agriculture, 1992 and 1997 and RMA 1992, 1997.   35 
 
Table 5. Mean Total Insurance Coverage by Sales Category and Year  
 
Sales category  1992  1997  1997-1992 
Sales < $25,000  146.40  550.40  404.00 
  (275.20)  (1347.10)   
$25,000 < Sales£ $100,000  771.40  1913.80  1142.40 
  (990.90)  (2964.00)   
$100,000 < Sales£ $250,000  1827.10  4016.10  2189.00 
  (2003.40)  (4665.40)   
Sales > $250,000  3771.40  7464.80  3693.40 
  (5518.60)  (9197.00)   
 
Note: Standard Deviation in parentheses. Source: Census of Agriculture, 1992 and 1997 and Risk 
Management Agency 1992 and 1997. 
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Table 6.  Change in Cropland Harvested - using various fixed effects, and interactions of fixed effects 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Parameter  Estimate  Std. Err.  Estimate  Std. Err.  Estimate  Std. Err.  Estimate  Std. Err. 
Intercept  127.70**  16.16  96.49**  21.54  98.49**  23.07  268.55  227.05 
￿
 Cov  * lag Sales < 25  -1.63**  0.23  -1.75**  0.23  -1.76**  0.24  -1.46**  0.27 
￿
 Cov  * lag Sales 25-100  -2.01**  0.35  -2.01**  0.35  -2.01**  0.35  -2.71**  0.47 
￿
 Cov  * lag Sales 100-250  0.10  0.51  0.18  0.51  0.21  0.51  0.12  0.65 
￿
 Cov  * lag Sales > 250  8.32**  0.73  8.68**  0.74  8.67**  0.74  8.98*  0.90 
lag Sales < 25  124.15**  4.98  132.53**  5.04  132.38**  5.06  -209.96*  95.23 
lag Sales 25-100  113.73**  4.75  117.19**  4.78  117.25**  4.79  -158.74*  75.73 
lag Sales 100-250  86.25**  4.98  87.22**  4.99  87.30**  5.00  -87.98  73.21 
Age 35-40  -17.02**  6.12  -16.62**  6.11  -16.47**  6.11  -16.17**  6.09 
Age 40-45  -43.32**  5.83  -42.95**  5.83  -42.75**  5.83  -42.02**  5.81 
Age 45-50  -80.68**  5.84  -80.19**  5.83  -79.89**  5.84  -79.30**  5.82 
Age 50-55  -112.75**  6.00  -112.17**  5.99  -111.96**  6.00  -111.50**  5.98 
Age 55-60  -138.32**  6.14  -137.45**  6.14  -137.26**  6.15  -136.62**  6.13 
Age 60-65  -173.83**  6.38  -173.39**  6.38  -173.20**  6.38  -171.91**  6.36 
Age 65-70  -241.33**  6.79  -241.80**  6.80  -241.63**  6.80  -240.02**  6.78 
Age >70  -252.42**  6.97  -253.30**  6.98  -253.25**  6.99  -252.12**  6.97 
Sex=male  -36.79**  7.96  -36.80**  7.95  -37.12**  7.95  -37.88**  7.93 
Experience  1.78**  0.13  1.85**  0.13  1.86**  0.13  1.88**  0.13 
Gov_pay_acre 97  -0.11**  0.02  -0.12**  0.02  -0.12**  0.02  -0.15**  0.02 
lag SIC Codes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
State Fixed Effects  no  yes  yes  yes 
lag Price*Share (Commodity)  no  no  yes  yes 
Fixed Effect Interaction Terms  no  no  no  yes 
Adj. R
2  0.038  0.042  0.042  0.054 
N  119996  119996  119996  119996 
 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 5% level; ** at the 1% level 
Fixed Effects Interaction Terms include: (1) [lag SIC]*[State]; (2) [lag SIC]*[lag Price*Share Commodity]; (3) [lag SIC]*[lag Sales];         
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Table 8.  Diversification – various measures 
  (1) 
￿
 Largest Share  
(2) 
￿
 Total Entropy 
(3) 
￿
 Related Entropy 
(4) 
￿
 Unrelated Entropy 
(5) 
￿
 Herfindahl Index 
Parameter  Estimate  Std. Err.  Estimate  Std. Err.  Estimate  Std. Err.  Estimate  Std. Err.  Estimate  Std. Err. 
Intercept  0.03  0.10  -1.79  5.50  4.59  3.99  -6.38  4.28  0.08  0.11 
￿
 Cov  * lag Sales < 25  0.003**  0.0001  -0.13**  0.01  -0.03**  0.005  -0.09**  0.005  0.004**  0.0001 
￿
 Cov  * lag Sales 25-100  0.005**  0.0002  -0.29**  0.01  -0.08**  0.008  -0.21**  0.01  0.006**  0.0002 
￿
 Cov  * lag Sales 100-250  0.005**  0.0003  -0.33**  0.02  -0.09**  0.01  -0.24**  0.01  0.007**  0.0003 
￿
 Cov  * lag Sales > 250  0.004**  0.0004  -0.29**  0.02  -0.09**  0.02  -0.20**  0.02  0.005**  0.0004 
lag Sales < 25  0.07  0.04  -6.98**  2.31  -1.51  1.67  -5.47**  1.80  0.07  0.05 
lag Sales 25-100  -0.01  0.03  -1.73  1.83  0.97  1.33  -2.70  1.43  0.002  0.04 
lag Sales 100-250  0.008  0.003  -0.96  1.77  0.88  1.29  -1.84  1.38  0.01  0.04 
Age 35-40  0.01**  0.003  -0.81**  0.14  -0.45**  0.11  -0.36**  0.11  0.02**  0.003 
Age 40-45  0.02**  0.002  -1.35**  0.14  -0.78**  0.10  -0.57**  0.11  0.03**  0.003 
Age 45-50  0.03**  0.002  -1.86**  0.14  -1.06**  0.10  -0.80**  0.11  0.04**  0.003 
Age 50-55  0.04**  0.003  -2.41**  0.14  -1.36**  0.10  -1.04**  0.11  0.05**  0.003 
Age 55-60  0.04**  0.003  -2.64**  0.15  -1.53**  0.11  -1.11**  0.12  0.05**  0.003 
Age 60-65  0.05**  0.003  -3.15**  0.15  -1.91**  0.11  -1.24**  0.12  0.06**  0.003 
Age 65-70  0.06**  0.003  -3.93**  0.16  -2.38**  0.12  -1.56**  0.13  0.08**  0.003 
Age >70  0.07**  0.003  -4.34**  0.17  -2.76**  0.12  -1.58**  0.13  0.09**  0.003 
Sex=male  0.01**  0.003  -0.80**  0.19  -0.30**  0.14  -0.50**  0.15  0.01**  0.004 
Experience  -0.0007**  0.0001  0.05**  0.003  0.03**  0.002  0.02**  0.002  -0.001**  0.0001 
Gov_pay_acre 97  0.00005**  9.38E-6  -0.004**  0.001  -0.002**  0.0004  -0.002**  0.0004  5.3E-5**  1.1E-5 
All Fixed Effects and 
Interaction Fixed Effects 
yes 
 
yes  yes  yes  yes 
Adj. R
2  0.206  0.209  0.200  0.210  0.193 
N  119996  119996  119996  119996  119996 
 
Notes:  ** significant at the 1% level; * at the 5% level.   
Fixed Effects include: lag SIC codes; State fixed effects; lag Price*Share of Commodity. 
Interaction Fixed Effects include: [lag SIC]*[State]; [lag SIC]*[lag Price*Share Commodity]; [lag SIC]*[lag Sales]; [State]*[lag Price*Share 
Commodity]; [State]*[lag Sales]; and [lag Price*Share Commodity]*[lag Price*Share Commodity] 